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Abstract
This paper develops a model in which competing governments of-
fer nancial incentives to induce individual rms to locate within
their jurisdictions. Equilibrium is described under three speci-
cations of the supplementary taxes. There is no misallocation of
capital under two of these specications, and there might or might
not be capital misallocation under the third. This result contrasts
strongly with that of the standard tax competition model, which
does not allow governments to treat rms individually. That
model nds that competition among governments almost always
leads to capital misallocation.
1 Introduction
The tax competition literature assumes that the economy is divided into
autonomous regions, and that capital can move freely between the regions.
Its objective is to determine the rates at which the regions will tax prots,
and the impact of the prots tax on resource allocation. It nds that the
The authors are grateful to two referees and participants at seminars at York Uni-
versity and the Queen's University public economics conference for their comments. Han
gratefully acknowledges nancial support from the Social Sciences and Humanities Re-
search Council of Canada.
1Government Annual
Company Location Investment Aid Output
Honda Lincoln, AL 825 248 270
Hyundai Montgomery, AL 1000 252 300
Nissan Canton, MS 1400 360 400
Toyota Princeton, IN 1900 117 400
Toyota San Antonio, TX 800 133 150
Toyota Woodstock, ON 625 100 100
Source: The Globe and Mail, Toronto, 1 July 2005. Investment and
aid are in millions of US dollars; output is in thousands of vehicles.
Table 1: Assembly Plants Built by Asian Auto Makers in North America
since 1998
tax rates generally vary across regions, and that the variation in tax rates
leads to an inecient allocation of capital: the low tax regions use too much
capital and the high tax regions use too little (see Wilson 1999). A limita-
tion of this literature is that it assumes that a government can only attract
capital by reducing the rate at which it taxes prots. In reality governments
attach so much importance to new capital investment that they will often
make substantial nancial concessions to get it. Table 1 shows the conces-
sions recently given to Asian auto makers building assembly plants in North
America. These concessions have been as high as 30% of the new investment.
If competition among governments is to be properly understood, the focus
must be on the overall nancial package and the way in which that package
varies from rm to rm. A model of this sort is described here. A key element
of the model is that capital is embodied in heterogeneous rms. Each rm
is mobile, and each rm's productivity varies from region to region. The
rms dier in the way that their productivity varies across regions. Each
rm receives an oer from the government of every region, and locates in the
region in which its after-tax prots would be highest. The government uses
its tax revenue to provide a public good to the region's citizens.
Casual observation shows that governments are prepared to negotiate
with some rms but not with others, so this model is an abstraction. The
standard tax competition model, in which no-one gets a special deal, is also
an abstraction. Our view is that these two models constitute polar cases in
2the study of tax competition. Reality lies somewhere between them, but only
one of the two poles has been carefully studied. Our hope is that models like
this one will ultimately lead to a more balanced view of tax competition.
Our basic model assumes that each government can levy a tax on the
prots of rms located within its jurisdiction, and that the government can
also levy a lump-sum tax on the incomes of the citizenry. Under these
assumptions, the standard tax competition model predicts optimal public
goods provision but misallocation of capital. This nding was rst presented
by Hamada (1966). Hamada's model has been expanded in many dierent
ways, but its core result has remained largely unchanged. The bargaining
model, by contrast, predicts both optimal public goods provision and optimal
allocation of capital. The resource misallocation that has been the focus of
the tax competition literature is simply not there.
Since the existence of such a broadly based lump-sum tax might be viewed
with some scepticism, we consider two alternative assumptions. The rst is
that the lump-sum tax strikes only wages. Capital is again correctly al-
located, but optimal provision of the public good is no longer guaranteed.
Public goods are optimally provided if the constraint on lump-sum taxation
is not binding, and they are underprovided if it is binding. The second is
Wilson's (1999) assumption that the prots tax is the only tax.1 Wilson
shows that, under this assumption, the standard tax competition model pre-
dicts both underprovision of the public good and misallocation of capital.
The bargaining model is more agnostic. There is underprovision and capital
misallocation if the typical rm's gross prots would not fall greatly if it
moved from its best location to its second best location, and there is optimal
provision and optimal capital allocation if this move would cause the typical
rm's gross prots to fall dramatically.
An important feature of these results is that they are derived from a gen-
eral equilibrium model, and hence can be directly compared to those of the
standard xed-rate model of tax competition. A number of earlier papers
have oered explanations of the tax breaks given to mobile rms, but these
papers have described the negotiations between a single rm and one or two
governments. Doyle and van Wijnbergen (1994) examine the intertemporal
structure of a rm's tax payments. They note that a mobile rm has greater
1Our assumption is actually slightly dierent from Wilson's, in that we assume that
a government that raises too much revenue through the prots tax can return the excess
revenue to the citizens through a negative lump-sum tax. Wilson requires an exact match
between revenue and public goods expenditure.
3bargaining power than a rm that has already incurred the sunk costs asso-
ciated with locating in a particular region. They argue that mobile rms will
use their extra bargaining power to extract concessions. Bond and Samuel-
son (1986) present an alternative explanation of the same phenomenon: a
region can oer a tax holiday to a mobile rm to signal that rms that lo-
cate there experience high productivity. The rm will willingly pay higher
tax rates in later periods because it is very productive, and these high tax
rates allow the government to recover the cost of the initial tax holiday. A
low-productivity region could not oer the same incentive: rms that located
there would relocate when they found that they had low productivity, so the
region would be unable to recover the cost of the tax holiday. King, McAfee
and Welling (1993) allow the rm to negotiate simultaneously with two gov-
ernments, and add a stochastic element to the regional productivities. Black
and Hoyt (1989) take an altogether dierent approach, arguing that subsidies
to mobile rms can undo the distortionary eects of average cost pricing of
publicly provided services.
Section 2 of this paper sets out an economy in which rms earn loca-
tional rents. Section 3 describes the Pareto optimal allocations. Section 4
describes the bargaining model, and derives the major result of the paper:
there is no misallocation of capital when governments bargain with rms.
Section 5 examines the role of the lump-sum tax, and section 6 contains brief
conclusions.
2 Preliminaries
The economy consists of I regions and a continuum of rms, each of which
operates one unit of capital. The regions are identied by the elements of
the set If1;:::;Ig: A rm is characterized by its ownership structure and
by its productivity in the various regions. A rm's ownership structure is
represented by the vector   (1; ;I), where i is the fraction of the rm
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i = 1
o
A rm's productivity in region i is governed by the parameter i 2 R+,
and the rm's productivity in each of the regions is described by the vector
  (1; ;I). The set of all possible productivity vectors is   RI
+: The
4distribution of rms is represented by a -nite measure space ( ;B;P):
Here,     is the sample space of rms, B is a -algebra over the sample
space, and P(X) denotes the measure of rms in any set X contained in B.
It is assumed that  is compact and that P is continuously dierentiable.
Each rm locates and produces in one of the regions, or in none of them.
The rm's output when it locates in region i, denoted yi, is determined by
i and by ni, the quantity of labour employed by the rm:
yi = F(i;ni)
The production function F is assumed to be concave, strictly increasing and
twice continuously dierentiable. Furthermore, it displays constant returns
to scale and satises the Inada conditions. The assumption of constant re-






where f is strictly increasing, strictly concave, twice continuously dieren-
tiable, and satises the Inada conditions.
The total quantity of labour available in region i is xed and equal to
Ni: Let Li      be the set of rms that locate in region i, and let
the distribution of rms across the economy be L  fL1; ;LIg. Let the
mapping n :     ! R+ describe the quantity of labour employed by rms
of each type.
The residents of each region consume two goods, a private good and
a public good. One unit of output can be transformed into one unit of
either good. Let ci 2 R+ be the aggregate quantity of the private good in
region i, and let gi 2 R+ be the aggregate quantity of the public good. The
social preferences of region i are represented by a social welfare function si,
which is assumed to be concave, strictly increasing, and twice continuously
dierentiable in (ci;gi). It is also assumed to satisfy the Inada conditions.
Let the vectors c  (c1; ;cI) and g  (g1; ;gI) describe the aggregate
quantities of the private and public goods in the economy as a whole.
An allocation is a list (L;c;g;n): An allocation is feasible if
F1. The sets in L are disjoint, and [I
i=1Li     

















Note that this denition of feasibility allows goods produced in one region to
be used to increase the aggregate consumption of another region.
Allocations can dier in ways that do not lead to dierences in aggregates
or in social welfare. The following concepts will be used to identify allocations
that dier only in inconsequential ways.
Denition 1 Any two sets B and B0 in B are measurably identical if
P((B [ B
0)   (B \ B
0)) = 0
Denition 2 Any two mappings  :     ! R+ and ' :     ! R+ are
measurably identical if
Pf(;) 2     : (;) 6= '(;)g = 0
Two sets are measurably identical if one can be obtained from the other
by adding and/or subtracting a set of measure zero, and two mappings are
measurably identical if their dierences are conned to a part of the domain
that is measure zero.
3 Pareto Optimal Allocations
A feasible allocation (L;c;g;n) is Pareto optimal if there does not exist an
alternative feasible allocation (L0;c0;g0;n0) such that si(c0
i;g0
i) is at least as
great as si(ci;gi) for all i and si(c0
i;g0
i) is greater than si(ci;gi) for some i.
The nature of the Pareto optimal allocations is determined in two steps.
Condition F3 and the monotonicity of the social welfare functions imply that
any Pareto optimal allocation maximizes the total output of the economy.
Since total output is entirely determined by L and n, the rst step is to nd
the conditions under which (L;n) maximizes total output. The second step
is to nd the restrictions that Pareto optimality places on the allocation of
output (c;g).




































This identity breaks the rm's output into two components. The rst com-
ponent is capital's contribution to output (there is one unit of capital and
its contribution to output depends upon its productivity), and the second
is labour's contribution to output (note that f0 is the marginal product of
labour). The following lemma shows that total output is maximized when
each rm locates in the region in which capital's contribution to output is
maximized. The proof of this result is contained in the appendix, as are the
proofs of all subsequent results.
Lemma 1 Let (L;n) satisfy the conditions:
a. [I
i=1L
i =    
b. For all (;) 2 L

























An arbitrary tie-breaking rule determines the placement of (;) if the
product jr(
j) attains its maximum in more than one region j.
Then:
71. Under any given tie-breaking rule, (L;n) exists and is unique. Each
L
i is non-empty.
2. Total output is maximized if and only if (L;n) is measurably identical
to (L;n):
The rst condition simply states that every rm must locate somewhere.
The second requires the ratio ni=i to be the same for every rm that locates
in region i: Since each rm's marginal product of labour is determined by this
ratio, this condition ensures that the marginal product of labour is equalized
across the rms that locate in region i. The third condition states that
each rm locates in the region in which capital's contribution to output is
maximized. It is not surprising that output maximization requires the rst
and second conditions, but why does it require the third condition? Suppose
that a small but positive measure of rms is moved from region h to region j.
The rms entering region j are provided with labour by shifting labour away
from the rms that were already in that region, so labour's contribution to the
output of the new rms is exactly oset by the fall in labour's contribution
to the output of the existing rms. Likewise, the departure of the rms
leaving region h means that more labour is available to the remaining rms,
so that the loss of labour's contribution to the output of the departing rms
is oset by an increase in labour's contribution to the output of the rms
that remain. The change in total output is therefore equal to the change in
capital's contribution to the output of the rms that move.
Let Y  be the maximal value of total output, and let R  (R1;:::;RI)
represent the way in which total output is distributed across regions. The
denition of a feasible allocation assumed that goods produced in one region





A unit of the produced good can be converted into one unit of either good,
so
ci + gi = Ri for all i 2 I (2)
Given Ri; the optimal choice of (ci;gi) maximizes si(ci;gi) subject to (2) and
non-negativity constraints on ci and gi. The restrictions on si imply that the
non-negativity constraints do not bind for any positive Ri.
Theorem 1 fully characterizes a Pareto optimal allocation.
8Theorem 1 A feasible allocation (L;n;c;g) is Pareto optimal if and only if
P1. (L;n) is measurably identical to (L;n):






for each i 2 I.
The location of the rms and the allocation of labour across rms are
measurably identical in every Pareto optimal allocation, but the division of
resources between the regions varies substantially across the Pareto optimal
allocations. Indeed, every division of resources that satises (1) is part of
some Pareto optimal allocation.
4 Bargaining over Tax Rates
A government sets the rate at which it taxes the prots of all rms, but
it can also oer tax holidays, infrastructure investment, loan guarantees or
other nancial incentives to particular rms. A rm evaluates an oer by
calculating the implied maximal after-tax prots, that is, the after-tax prof-
its earned when the prot-maximizing quantity of labour is employed. To
simplify the analysis in this section, it is assumed that (a) the nancial con-
cessions, like the prots tax itself, do not distort the hiring decision, and (b)
the oer made by each government to a particular rm species the maximal
after-tax prots that the rm would earn in the region. The oers made
by the government of region i to rms of all types are represented by the
mapping i :     ! R, and the oers made by all governments are given
by   (1;:::;I):
An equilibrium consists of a collection (;c;g;w;L;n). It unfolds in two
stages:
1. The government of each region i, taking the oers of the other govern-
ments as given, chooses i such that region i's social welfare cannot be
raised by changing the maximal after-tax prots oered to the rms in
any set of positive measure. Each government anticipates the impact
of its policies on wage rates and on the rms' location and employment
decisions.
92. Firms of each type (;) locate in some region j if no other region
oers maximal after-tax prots greater than j(;): A rm that lo-
cates in regio i observes the market-clearing wage wi and employs the
prot maximizing quantity of labour. The government of each region
i chooses (ci;gi) and its own lump-sum tax to maximize the region's
social welfare function.
In stage 2 each rm locates in the region in which its maximal after-tax
prots are highest. If it locates in region i, it employs the quantity of labour








The ratio ni=i is the same for every rm in the region, and since the wage




The gross prots of a rm in this region are equal to ir(i).2
The resources available to region i, denoted Ri, are equal to domestic
output, less the after-tax prots earned within the region, plus the citizens'














Each region will use the lump-sum tax to ensure the optimal division of its
resources between the private and public goods, so it chooses its oers to
maximize the region's resources.
Lemma 2 Let  be given, and assume that each rm chooses its location to
maximize its after-tax prots. Region i cannot increase its resources Ri by
changing its oers to the rms in any set of positive measure if and only if
these conditions hold:
2Let m be a subset of the rms located in region i, and let zm be the be integral of
their productivities. Then zmf(i) is their total output, zmi is total employment at these
rms, and f0(i) is the wage rate.
10E1. Almost every rm that locates in region i has a matching oer from
some other region.
E2. Almost every rm that locates in region i satises
ir(i)  i(;)
E3. Almost every rm that locates in any other region j satises
ir(i)  j(;)
Consider a rm that locates in some region i: Condition 2 implies that
the rm's gross prots in that region are at least as great as its after-tax
prots in the same region. Condition 3 implies that its after-tax prots in
region i are at least as great as its gross prots in any other region. It follows
that a rm locates in region i almost always attains its greatest gross prots
in that region, and that its after-tax prots almost always lie between its
second highest and highest gross prots.




The range of possible eective tax rates is very wide. A rm's eective
tax rate is 0 if its second highest gross prots are equal to its highest gross
prots. It can be as high as 1 if the rm's second highest gross prots are
equal to zero|that is, if the rm is eectively immobile. The eective tax
rate is never negative, implying that any concessions received by a rm are
subsequently taxed back.
In a xed-rate model with homogeneous capital, the signs of the regions'
tax rates are determined by Hamada's (1966) terms of trade eect. If there
are only two regions, for example, the region that is a net recipient of after-
tax prots will choose a negative tax rate. Its subsidization of capital will
drive up the economy-wide after-tax return to capital, which is benecial
to a region that receives more prots than it pays out. The other region
will do the opposite, taxing prots to drive down the economy-wide after-tax
return to capital. Burbidge, Cu and Leach (2006) show that the terms of
trade eect survives, albeit in a weaker form, when the production technology
described in section 2 is employed in a xed-rate model of tax competition.
11This technology creates locational rents for the rms. Since governments can
capture locational rents that would otherwise accrue to foreigners by levying
positive prots taxes, the presence of locational rents puts upward pressure
on the prot tax. In this model the terms of trade eect determines the
relative sizes of the tax rates rather than their signs. By contrast, nothing
resembling the terms of trade eect arises in the bargaining model.
The terms of trade eect causes the distribution of ownership to play a
critical role in determining the tax rates in xed rate models. There is no
terms of trade eect in the bargaining model, so the distribution of ownership
has no impact on the eective tax rates.
Since almost every rm locates in the region in which its gross prots are
greatest, it is not surprising that an equilibrium allocation is Pareto optimal.
Theorem 2 If the governments can tax the incomes of domestic residents
in a lump-sum fashion, an equilibrium exists. The equilibrium allocations are
measurably identical and Pareto optimal, and the market-clearing wages are
identical across equilibria.
The bargaining model shows that tax competition does not necessarily
lead to a misallocation of resources. The lump-sum tax plays a signicant
role in generating this result, but the next section shows that an ecient
allocation of resources can arise without one.
5 The Lump-Sum Tax
It has been assumed that the government is able to levy lump-sum taxes
on wages and on the domestic residents' share of the after-tax prots of all
rms. The role played by the lump-sum tax is explored here by eliminating
the lump-sum tax in a stepwise fashion. The rst step limits the scope of
the lump-sum tax to wages, and the second eliminates the lump-sum tax
entirely.3 These changes have quite dierent (and perhaps surprising) eects
on the equilibrium.
There is no change in the equilibrium concept, but there is an additional
restriction on each government's behaviour. If the lump-sum tax has limited
scope, some of the region's resources cannot be appropriated by the govern-
ment and therefore cannot be allocated to the provision of the public good.
3The assumption that a government can transfer excess revenue back to the citizens in
a lump-sum fashion is retained throughout.
12Let R
g
i be the part of region i's resources that can be allocated to the pub-
lic good, and let Rc
i be the part that cannot be allocated to it. Region i's























5.1 Only Wages are Subject to Lump-Sum Taxation
Under this assumption, the government can nance the public good from



















Restricting the governments' choices in this fashion does not alter the oers
that the governments make and does not alter the equilibrium (L;n):
Lemma 3 Assume that governments can tax only the wages of domestic
residents in a lump-sum fashion, and that region i will choose this tax to
maximize social welfare si: Let  be given, and assume that each rm chooses
its location to maximize its after-tax prots. Region i cannot increase si by
changing its oers to the rms in any set of positive measure if and only if
conditions E1{E3 hold.
As before, these conditions imply that a rm almost always locates in
the region in which its gross prots are highest, and that its after-tax prots
almost always lie between its second highest and highest gross prots.
The government of region i is willing to oer the same after-tax prots
when the inequality constraint is binding|when government revenue has a
high social value|as when it is not binding. A binding constraint implies
13that R
g
i is low relative to Rc
i. Since R
g
i is derived entirely from rms that
locate within the region, and since any reduction in the after-tax prots
oered to a rm will induce the rm to locate elsewhere, the government is
unwilling to moderate its oer to any rm.
Theorem 3 Assume that only the wages of domestic residents can be taxed
in a lump-sum fashion. Then an equilibrium exists, and the market-clearing
wages are the same in every equilibrium. Also,
1. (L;n) is measurably identical to (L;n).
2. An equilibrium that gives rise to a Pareto optimal allocation exists un-
der some specications of the model.
Since the oers that are made to each rm do not change when the
scope of the lump-sum tax is restricted, neither does the actual location of
the rm. Total output is maximized even under the more restrictive tax
assumption. However, there is no assurance that each government will raise
enough revenue to provide the ecient quantity of public goods.
These results are the reverse of a common representation of Hamada's
(1966) tax competition model. In that model, the existence of a lump-sum
wage tax is commonly assumed to ensure the optimal provision of public
goods, while the terms of trade eect causes capital to be misallocated across
regions. Our ndings are that rms (which embody the available capital) are
correctly allocated across regions, but that the optimal provision of public
goods is not assured.
5.2 No Lump-Sum Tax
Wilson (1999) studies a xed-rate tax competition model in which the prots
tax is the only available tax. He nds that, if the regions are not identical,
the equilibrium tax rates distort both the division of capital between regions
and the division of a region's resources between the private and public goods.
If the regions are identical, each region will underprovide the public good.
An analogous equilibrium is described here.
The resources of government i are
R
c



















Equilibrium after-tax prots are now inuenced by the relative scarcities of
the two types of resources. Their relative scarcity is summarized by the










which measures the value of a unit of R
g
i in terms of Rc
i, or equivalently, a unit
of public goods in terms of private goods. The marginal rate of substitution
is 1 if the inequality constraint in the government's maximization problem
is not binding, and it is greater than 1 if it is binding. After-tax prots are




The following lemma describes the location of the rms and their after-tax
prots in any equilibrium.
Lemma 4 Assume that the prots tax is the only available tax. Consider a
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for all j 2 I












 i(;)  i(i;MRSi)
An additional rm brings ir(i) additional units of resources to region i:
A fraction "(i) accrues to the region in the form of wages and the remainder
accrues as pre-tax prots. Each unit of untaxable wages is worth one unit
of private goods or 1=MRSi units of public goods, and each unit of taxable
gross prots is worth one unit of public goods, so i(i;MRSi) represents
15the value of these additional resources measured in units of public goods. The
cost of attracting a rm is i(;) units of after-tax prots, each unit of which
has an opportunity cost of one unit of public goods. Thus, i(i;MRSi) and
i(;) represent the benet and cost of an additional rm, both measured
in units of public goods.
If the provision of public goods in some region i is not constrained by a
lack of tax revenue|if MRSi is equal to one|the lowest eective tax rate
that a rm might pay is zero. However, a region that is constrained by its tax








This rate rises from zero as MRSi rises from one. Likewise, the rm's max-
imum eective tax rate rises with the marginal rate of substitution in the
region that places the next highest value on the rm.
The existence and uniqueness of equilibrium has not been proved for this
economy. The remainder of this section explores the properties of equilibrium






so that " is constant. The following lemma shows that, for these economies,
there is a link between the two elements of Pareto optimality, namely output
maximization and ecient allocation.
Lemma 5 Assume that the prots tax in the only tax and that the production
function is (3). In any equilibrium, output is maximized if and only if every
region has the same marginal rate of substitution.
Lemma 5 suggests that almost all equilibria fall into one of two categories:
either the allocation is Pareto optimal, or total output is not maximized
and public goods are underprovided. The only exceptions are "knife-edge"
equilibria in which every region underprovides the public good but has the
same marginal rate of substitution, so that total output is maximized. The
symmetric equilibrium will sometimes be of this unusual type.
Imagine an economy with two regions, each of which has the production
function (3). There is one unit of labour in each region. The productivity
prole of a rm takes one of two forms: it is either
(1;2) = (b ;b )
16or
(1;2) = (b ;b )
Here,  is a positive fraction and b  is an element of some bounded interval
of positive real numbers, denoted J. For any subset X of J, the fraction of
all rms for which b  is contained in X is given by the measure P(X): Half
of these rms are more productive in region 1 and half are more productive
in region 2. It is also assumed that
Z
J
b dP = 1
which implies that the measure of all rms is 2. The fraction of a rm of type
(b ;b ) owned by the residents of region 1 is equal to the fraction of a rm
of type (b ;b ) owned by the residents of region 2, and is denoted (b ): This
assumption implies that half of all after-tax prots accrue to each region. It
is assumed that each rm pays the largest tax consistent with equilibrium.
One candidate for the equilibrium allocation is the output-maximizing
allocation. Under this allocation, each rm goes to the region in which
its productivity factor is greatest. The available labour in each region i is
distributed across the rms so that the ratio ni=b  is the same for all rms.
Then, in each region i,
Zi = i = Yi = 1
R
c
i = 1   (1   )
R
g
i = (1   )
The oer made to each rm is equal to its gross prots in the low-productivity
region. That is, rms of type (b ;b ) or type (b ;b ) are oered after-tax prof-
its of b : This allocation is an equilibrium allocation if neither government
can increase social welfare in its region by changing its oers to a measurable
set of rms. This condition is satised; see the appendix for details.
Although the symmetric equilibrium always maximizes output, it might
or might not eciently allocate output. Under any increasing and strictly
concave social welfare function, public goods will be optimally provided if
R
g
i is a suciently large part of total output, or equivalently, if (1   ) is
suciently large. A high value of  implies that prots|the only part of
output that is taxable|constitute a large fraction of output. A small value
of  implies that every rm's second-best location is much worse than its
best location, so that it is willing to accept high taxes in the best location.
17The xed-rate tax competition model does not generate a Pareto optimal
allocation, but the bargaining model will sometimes to do so. This dierence
arises in part because the rms in the bargaining model are less mobile
than the rms in the xed-rate model. Capital in the xed-rate model is
truly mobile, in the sense that it can move to any region and is equally
productive in every region. Each rm in the bargaining model is mobile
in the sense that it can locate in any region, but it might be immobile in
the sense that it cannot move between regions without a signicant loss of
productivity. The extent of these productivity losses largely explains the
dierence in results. If each rm's second best option is almost as good
as its best option, the government's revenue is likely to be so small that
public goods will be underprovided, and underprovision almost always leads
to capital misallocation. However, if each rm's second best option is much
worse than its best option, each government will be able to collect signicant
tax revenue. If each region's preferences for the public good are not very
strong, these revenues might be large enough to allow each region to provide
the optimal quantity of public goods. There is no capital misallocation if
public goods are optimally provided in every region. Thus, relatively high
mobility (in the sense of movement without signicant loss) gives rise to
allocations that are not Pareto optimal, as in Wilson (1999), while relatively
low mobility gives rise to Pareto optimal allocations.
6 Conclusions
The standard model of tax competition assumes that each government taxes
every rm's prots at the same rate. Regional dierences in productivity or
in endowments lead to an equilibrium in which there is a range of tax rates.
Resources are misallocated, with the low tax regions using too much capital
and the high tax regions using too little. By contrast, the model set out
above assumes that the governments negotiate separately with every rm.
The predictions of the model depend upon the nature of the supplementary
taxes in the economy. If all of income is subject to a lump-sum tax, a Pareto
optimal allocation is reached; if only wages are subject to a lump-sum tax,
there can be underprovision of the public good but capital is again optimally
allocated. A Pareto optimal allocation might even occur if governments
cannot use a lump-sum tax to raise revenue.
187 Appendix
Let k  (k1; ;kI) be a vector of non-negative real numbers. For each k,
let L(k)  fL1(k); ;LI(k)g be the unique collection of disjoint sets that
satises these conditions:
C1. [I
i=1Li(k) =    :
C2. For each i 2 I, (;) 2 Li(k) implies that kii = max[k11; ;kII]:
An arbitrary \tie-breaking" rule determines the placement of rms for





idP for all i 2 I
and let k be the solution to the equation system





for all i 2 I (4)
Here, each i is a positive constant. Then k has these properties.
FP1. The vector k exists and is unique, and k
i and Zi(k) are strictly pos-
itive for each i 2 I:
FP2. An increase in j causes k
j and each ratio k
j=k
i (i 2 I;i 6= j) to rise.









for all i 2 I













 for all i 2 I (5)
19By denition, every xed point of (4) gives rise to a unique xed point of













for all i 2 I
so that each xed point of (5) gives rise to a xed point of (4). Thus, k
exists and is unique if s exists and is unique. The existence and uniqueness
of s are proved in turn:
1. The diculty of proving the existence of the xed point of (5) is that
the right-hand side of (5) is not bounded or not dened if some ki is zero.

























This set is non-empty, compact and convex. For each  > 0, the mapping
q : S ! S is well-dened even when some elements of s are zero. The
assumptions on P ensure that q is a continuous mapping from S into S.
Taken together, these conditions ensure the existence of a xed point s =
(s
1; ;s
I). Furthermore, the construction of the mapping ensures that s
i















 for all i 2 I
Since 0 < s
i < 1 for all i at each , the positive sequence fsg is bounded.
Therefore, there exists a subsequence of fsg that must converge as  ! 0.
For simplicity, assume that we choose this convergent subsequence right from
the start so that fsg itself converges to s as  ! 0.
Now we will show that 0 < s
i < 1 for all i 2 I: Suppose not. Then
there exists a non-empty subset D  I such that s
i = 0 for all i 2 D. Then
we have Zi(s) = 0 for all i 2 D because every rm will be located in some
20region i0 such that s
i0 > 0. Furthermore, Zi(s) ! Zi(s) = 0 as  ! 0. P
l2D s

























Note that s is a xed point of q, so Zl(s) +  is bounded and positive for







is a bounded and
positive sequence. Furthermore, because r is positive and strictly increasing,








bounded above z. Therefore, we have
P
l2D s
l 9 0 as  ! 0. This contradicts P
l2D s
l = 0. It follows that 0 < s
i < 1 for all i. Since s is a xed point of
(5) and 0 < s
i < 1 for all i, we have Zi(s) > 0 for all i. Therefore, a xed
point k (with k
i > 0 for all i) of (4) exists and Zi(k) = Zi(s) > 0 for all i
2. Assume that s is not a unique xed point, and let s0 and s1 be two
of the xed points. Let region a be the region in which the ratio s0
i=s1
i is
lowest. This ratio must be smaller than 1. (If it were not, every element of
s0 would be greater than the corresponding element of s1. Since every xed
point has the property that
P
i si = 1, at least one of the two vectors could












Furthermore, the inequality must be strict for some j. Since a rm locates
in region a if and only if a > j(sj=sa) for all j 6= a, (6) implies that
















which contradicts the initial assumption that s0
a=s1
a is smaller than 1. Thus,
the xed point s must be unique. 
Proof of FP2: This property is proved by demonstrating that any other
outcome leads to a contradiction. If Zj(k) does not rise when j rises, k
j
must rise to satisfy the jth equation in the system. However, if Zj(k) does not
21rise, there must be at least one element k
i that rises by a greater proportion
than k
j: Let k
h be the element that experiences the greatest proportionate
increase. Since k
h and Zh(k) both rise, the hth equation in the system
is not satised. Thus, Zj(k) must rise in response to the increase in j:
If k
j does not rise while Zj(k) rises, there must be at least one element
k
i that falls by a greater proportion than k
j: Let k
h be the element that
experiences the greatest proportionate decline. Since both k
h and Zh(k)
fall, the hth equation in the system is not satised. Thus, the rise in Zj(k)
must be accompanied by an increase in k
j: Let k
h be the element of k that
experiences the greatest proportionate increase. If its proportionate increase
is at least as great as that of k
j, Zh(k) also rises, so that the hth equation
in the system cannot be satised. It follows that the proportionate increase
in k
j must be greater than the proportionate increase in any other element
of k. 
Proof of Lemma 1: The restrictions that Lemma 1 places upon L imply









for all i 2 I








for all i 2 I (7)
Since this system is simply (4) with i set equal to one, the existence and
uniqueness of k and L follows immediately from FP1, as does the nding
that each L
i is non-empty. The labour allocation n is entirely determined
by L: To prove the second part of Lemma 1, suppose that the location
decision L is not measurably identical to L(k). Then, under the location
rule L, there exists a compact set Mi of rms in region i such that P(Mi) > 0
and kjj > kii for all rms in Mi. It will be shown that moving a subset
of these rms from region i to region j raises total output. Let Mi be the
set of all subsets of Mi, and identify some (;) 2 Mi. Dene a mapping
m : R+ ! Mi such that (i) m(0) = (;); (ii) m(x0)  m(x) for all x0 and
x such that x0 < x, and (iii) C = P  m is continuous and dierentiable at
all x 2 R+. The rms in the set m(x) will be moved from region i to region
j; C(x) is their measure. For each m(x), let v(x) be the decline in region
i's aggregate productivity when the rms are moved out of region i, and let
22h(x) be the increase in region j's aggregate productivity gain when the rms
are moved into that region. Since C is continuous and dierentiable, v and
h are continuous and dierentiable. Assuming that labour is reallocated to
equalize the marginal product of labour across the rms in each region, the
movement of the rms causes total output to rise by
D(x;k
) = F (Zj(k
) + h(x);Nj)   F (Zi(k
)   v(x);Ni)
Taking the rst-order derivative of D with respect to x and evaluating it at






























for every rm that is moved between regions, this derivative is positive. That
is, moving a small but positive measure of rms between the regions raises
total output. Then L does not maximize total output if L is not measurably
identical to L(k), where where k is some xed point of (7). Therefore, it is
necessary condition for the output-maximizing location rule L that L must
be measurably identical to L(k), where kis some xed point of (7). Since
there exists a unique xed point k of (7), the necessary condition becomes
the sucient one for the output-maximizing location rule. 
Proof of Theorem 1: P1 follows from Lemma 1. Given Ri; region i's
problem is to nd (ci;gi) to maximize si subject to ci + gi  Ri: Since si is
increasing, the constraint must hold with equality at a solution. Given the
assumptions on si, P2 is both necessary and sucient for (ci;gi) to maximize
si subject to the constraint (2) Let (c
i(Ri);g
i(Ri)) be the solution to this
maximization problem. Since si is concave, increasing, and twice dieren-
tiable, si(c
i(Ri);g
i(Ri)) is increasing in Ri. Consequently, shifting resources
from one region to another raises one region's welfare at the expense of the
other region. Then any allocation of output that satises (1) can be part of
a Pareto optimal allocation. 
Denition: An oer is a winning oer if it is accepted by the rm. It
is a matching oer if it would give the rm the same after-tax prots as the
winning oer but is not accepted by the rm.
23Proof of Lemma 2: If region i contains a set of rms that have no
matching oers, and if this set has positive measure, region i can increase
its resources by slightly reducing its oers to these rms. Thus, condition
1 is a necessary condition for the absence of a revenue-increasing deviation.
The remainder of the proof assumes that this condition holds, and proceeds
in three parts. The rst part describes the deviations open to region i. The
second part shows that the second and third conditions hold if region i has
no resource-increasing deviation; and the third part shows that region i has
no resource-increasing deviation if all three conditions hold.
1. Region i's options are limited to one or both of the following: (a)
reduce the oers to the rms in a set of positive measure, causing them to
locate elsewhere; (b) raise the oers to the rms in a set of positive measure,
causing them to choose region i: To describe (a), let Mi be the set of all




contained in Li. Dene a mapping
m0 : R+ ! Mi such that (i) m0(0) = (0;0); (ii) m0(x0)  m0(x) for all x0
and x such that x0 < x, and (iii) C0  P m0 is continuous and dierentiable
at all x 2 R+. The rms in the set m0(x) will be induced to leave region i.













To describe (b), let L i be the set of rms that choose to locate in a region
other than i, and let M i be the set of all subsets of L i: Choose some
(
1;1) contained in L i: Dene a mapping m1 : R+ ! M i such that (i)
m1(0) = (1;1); (ii) m1(x0)  m1(x) for all x0 and x such that x0 < x, and
(iii) C1  P  m1 is continuous and dierentiable at all x 2 R+. The rms
in the set m1(x) will be induced to locate in region i, and their measure is












24Any deviation can be represented by choosing the functions m0 and m1 ap-
propriately and by evaluating them at appropriate points, denoted x0 and
x1 respectively. Since region i can induce a rm to move to that region by
matching the rm's best oer, its resources under a given deviation are
Ri(x0;x1) = (zi + A1(x1)   A0(x0))r

Ni
zi + A1(x1)   A0(x0)











2. If @Ri(0;0)=@x0 is positive, there exists some arbitrarily small but
positive  such that region i could increase Ri be reducing its oers to the









for almost all (
0;0), or equivalently, only if
ir(i)  i(;) (8)
for almost all (;) contained in Li: Likewise, if @Ri(0;0)=@x1 is positive,
there exists some arbitrarily small but positive  such that region i could
increase Ri be raising its oers to the rms in the set m1(): It follows that








for almost all (
1;1), or equivalently, only if
ir(i)  j(;) (9)
for almost all (;) contained in Lj (j 6= i): Thus, (8) and (9) are necessary
conditions for the absence of a resource-increasing deviation in region i:
3. Since A0 and A1 are strictly increasing functions, the implicit function
A1(x1) = A0(x0)
can be written as either of the following strictly increasing functions:
x1 = (x0)
25x0 =  (x1)
The function r is increasing, so information on the relative sizes of A0(x0)
















1(x1)  0 if A1(x1)  A0(x0) (11)
To show that the stated conditions are sucient for the absence of a resource-
increasing deviation, two cases must be considered.
Case 1. Assume that region i wants to drive away the rms in the set
m0(x
0) and attract the rms in the set m1(x
1), and that A1(x
1) is at least
















































The partial derivative in the rst integrand is evaluated at pairs (x
0;x1) for
which x1  (x
0), so (11) implies that the rst integral (if it is present) is
non-positive. The partial derivatives in the second integrand are evaluated
at pairs (x0;(x0)), so (10) and (11) imply that the second integral is also
non-positive. Thus, a deviation of this type does not increase Ri:
Case 2. Assume again that region i wants to drive away the rms in
the set m0(x
0) and attract the rms in the set m1(x
1), but now assume that
A1(x
















































Since (10) implies that the rst integral is non-positive, and (10) and (11)
imply that the second integral is non-positive, this kind of deviation does not
increase Ri: 
Proof of Theorem 2: The rst step is to show that a vector of market-
clearing wages exists, and that this vector is unique. A rm maximizes its








Let e ni(i;wi) be the solution that solves the rst-order condition above. In-




for every rm in region i: Dene the vector e k(w)  (e k1(w);:::;e kI(w)) such
that
e ki(w) = r(xi(wi)) for all i 2 I (14)
Lemma 2 shows that, under any wage vector w, a rm locates in the region
in which its gross prots are highest, so the rms' locations are given by
L(e k(w)). By (13), a rm's demand for labour is
e ni(i;wi) = ixi(w)
The aggregate demand for labour in region i is found by integrating over the








xi(wi) = Zi(e k(w))xi(wi)












A vector of market-clearing wages exists if and only if there exists a vector
e k(w) such that this condition is satised for all I markets, but the required
vector e k(w) is simply a xed point of (7). Lemma 1 shows that this xed
point exists and is unique, so a vector of market-clearing wages exists and is
unique. Furthermore, Lemma 2 implies that the locations of the rms and the
distribution of labor across rms are measurably identical across equilibria
because the market-clearing wage vector is identical across equilibria. Now
consider the issue of Pareto optimality. All of the rms in a region equate
their marginal products of labour to the market wage rate, so the marginal
products of labour are equalized across rms. The uniqueness of the xed
point implies that e k(w) is the same as k, so that any L(e k(w)) is measurably
identical to L(k) and hence P1 is satised. Since the governments use their
lump-sum taxes to attain an optimal division of their resources between the
public and private good, P2 is also satised. Therefore, the equilibrium
allocation induced by any equilibrium is Pareto optimal. 
Proof of Lemma 3: If the rms in Li that do not have matching oers
constitute a set of positive measure, region i could reduce its oers to these
rms without losing them. This adjustment would cause R
g
i to rise, and
Rc
i to fall by a smaller amount. Since a unit of Rc
i is never more valuable
than a unit of R
g
i, social welfare would rise. It follows that E! is a necessary
condition for the absence of a welfare-improving deviation. Assume that this
condition holds, and dene mh(x), Ah(x) and Bh(x) (h = 0;1) as in Lemma
2. Region i's resources when it abandons the rms in m0(x0) and attracts
the rms in m1(x1) are given by the functions
R
g
i(x0;x1) = (zi + A1(x1)   A0(x0))f

Ni
















i is not aected by a deviation, social welfare is maximized by maxi-
mizing R
g
i: Proceeding as in Lemma 2 shows that E2 and E3 hold if region i
28does not have a welfare-improving deviation, and that region i does not have
a welfare-improving deviation if E1{E3 hold. 
Proof of Theorem 3: The existence of an equilibrium can be proved
by showing the existence of the market clearing wage vector. Since every
rm locates into a region where it can attain its highest gross prots, the
market-clearing wage vector is unique and the same as the one proved in
the corresponding part of the proof of Theorem 2. It immediately follows
that the allocation of rms and the allocation of labour across rms are
measurably identical across equilibria when the government can only impose
the lump-sum tax on wages as when it can tax all of domestic income, so
(L;n) again maximizes total output. Item 2 follows from the non-negativity
of each region's revenues: these revenues can be sucient to provide the
optimal quantity of public goods. 
Proof of Lemma 4: The argument of Lemma 3 shows that E1 is a
necessary condition for the absence of a welfare-improving deviation in region
i: Assume that this condition holds, and dene mh(x), Ah(x) and Bh(x)
(h = 1;2) as in Lemma 2. Social welfare in region i under any given deviation
is






























i(x0;x1) = (zi + A1(x1)   A0(x0))r

Ni





i(;)dP + B0(x0)   B1(x1)
If @b i(0;0)=@x0 is positive, there exists an arbitrarily small but positive 
such that region i can increase si by reducing the oers to the rms in the
set m0(). Thus, region i has no welfare-improving deviation only if this

















+ (1   "(j))

 i(;) (16)
Likewise, if @b i(0;0)=@x1 is positive, there exists an arbitrarily small but
positive  such that region i can increase si by raising the oers to the rms
in the set m1(). Thus, region i has no welfare-improving deviation only if


















+ (1   "(i))

 h(;) (17)
Combining (16), (17) and the matching requirement gives the lemma. 
Proof of Lemma 5: Dene the variables
i   +
1   
MRSi
for all i 2 I (18)
and let  be the vector (1;:::I): In any equilibrium a rm goes to region i
only if
iki  jkj for all j 2 I












j for all j 2 I
Then an equilibrium distribution of rms across regions is described by






i for all i 2 I (19)
30By FP1, b k() exists and is unique for every strictly positive : The functions
b k() are continuous. As well, Zi(b k()) is continuous in , and by FP1, it




i() are also continuous. Since Li(b k() is non-empty for every
strictly positive vector , Rc
i() is positive and R
g
i() is non-negative for
every strictly positive vector . Now note that MRSi is a continuous function
of the region's resources and hence a continuous function of : Write this
relationship as
MRSi =  i()
and consider the mapping







The mapping  : D ! D is continuous and well-dened, so the mapping
has a xed point 
: All of the elements of an equilibrium can be inferred
from 

: The equilibrium L is L(b k(

)) or is measurably identical to it. The









Each region's wage is equal to its equilibrium marginal product of labour.







), and region i's consumption















Total output is maximized in an equilibrium if and only if there is some
positive  such that, for all i 2 I, b ki(

) = k
i where k is the solution
to (7). Assume that every marginal rate of substitution is the same. By
(18), every element of 

is equal to some , where  <   1. Since Zi(k)
is linearly homogeneous, and since b k() = k when every element of  is
equal to 1, b ki(

) = k so that total output is maximized. Now suppose
that total output is maximized, implying b k(

) = k: Evaluating (19) at
k determines a unique vector 

: Since it has already been shown that
b k(

) = k when every element of 

is equal to , this is the unique
solution for 

: Thus, total output maximization implies that every element
of 

is the same and hence every element of MRS is the same. 
31Proof that the symmetric allocation is an equilibrium allocation:
For concreteness, it will be shown that region 1 has no welfare-improving
deviations; the demonstration for region 2 is identical. Dene the functions
















b dP = A1(x1)













Since the region's resources under any deviation depend only upon the values












(b )b dP + A0   A1
A deviation (A0
0;A0
1) in which A0
1  A0
0 > 0 is dominated by the deviation
(0;A0
1 A0
0), because the latter deviation gives the same Rc





1) in which A0
0  A0
1 > 0 is dominated by the deviation
(A0
0  A0
1;0) for the same reason. It is therefore sucient to show that there
are no welfare-improving deviations (A0;A1) in which exactly one of A0 and





















   < 0
Both derivatives decline as A1 rises, so the region gives up the smallest
amount of R
g
1 for another unit of Rc
1 when A1 is equal to 0, and at this
point, one unit of R
g
1 is given up to obtain one more unit of Rc
1: Since MRS1
is never less than 1, this trade-o does not raise welfare. Now consider devi-





















Abandoning rms is clearly not welfare-improving if the second derivative is
also negative, so imagine that it is positive. Both derivatives decline as A0
rises, so the region gets the largest amount of R
g
1 in exchange for a unit of
Rc
1 when A0 is equal to zero, and at that point, less than a unit of R
g
1 is
obtained in exchange for one unit of Rc
1: Since MRS1 is never less than 1,
this trade-o does not raise welfare. 
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